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Abstract
An important feature of data collection frameworks, in which voluntary participants are
involved, is that of privacy. Besides data encryption, which protects the data from third
parties in case the communication channel is compromised, there are schemes to obfuscate
the data and thus provide some anonymity in the data itself, as well as schemes that ’mix’ the
data to prevent tracing the data back to the source by using network identifiers. This mixing
is usually implemented by utilizing special mix networks in the data collection framework.
In this paper we focus on schemes for mixing the data where the participants do not need
to trust the mix network or the data collector with hiding the source of the data so that
we can evaluate the efficacy of peer to peer mixing strategies in the real world. To achieve
this, we present a simple opportunistic multi-party shuffling scheme to mix the data and
effectively obfuscate the source of the data. We successfully simulate 3 cases with artificial
parameters and then use the real-world Mobile Data Challenge (MDC) data to simulate an
additional 2 scenarios with realistic parameters. Our results show that such approaches can
be effective depending on the time constraints of the data collection and we conclude with
design implications for the implementation of the proposed data collection scheme in real
life deployments.
1 Introduction
Mobile crowd sensing leverages the number of user-companioned devices, including mobile phones,
wearable devices, and smart vehicles, and their inherent mobility to collect information such as
location, personal and surrounding context, noise level, and more [1]. The users, acting as sen-
sors, have a certain expectation of privacy about the data they might be sharing and often do
not trust that is it possible to hide their identity while at the same time provide usable data [2].
Providing data privacy in crowd sensing or other participatory data collection context has been
an important task that ensures that the participants privacy is protected (ex., data cannot be
traced to the individual) while the data is being collected at large scales without bias stemming
from privacy-aspects (ex. participants switching off their phone in certain contexts). There are
several elements of the data collection process that can be exploited to reveal sensitive informa-
tion about the participants: the data communication channel, the reporting of the data, and the
data itself.
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Figure 1: A diagram of a generic data collection scheme where users collect data in some environ-
ment and then send the data through an optional mix network that can either be a geographical
zone in their environment or a separate network. The data is eventually communicated to the
data collector who may chose to use data obfuscation techniques to provide privacy to the users.
The communication channel is represented by arrows.
Securing the communication channel from third parties that might want to intercept the data
can be achieved using data encryption techniques. However, unless some additional steps are
introduced, the entity collecting the data (a researcher or a company), from here on referred to
as the data collector, can link the data to its source. Giving pseudonyms to the participants can
help mitigate this but it is still not completely safe. The data collector will still know that a
certain batch of data belongs to a certain pseudonym which can be compromising depending on
the content of the data. Even one piece of identifiable data will allow the data collector to know
that all the data in that batch with the same pseudonym belongs to the same user. For this
reason, mix networks were introduced in the data collection process. These networks mix the
batches of data from each participant and send it to the data collector which then has no way
to directly trace the source of a batch of data by essentially unlinking the data from all original
network identifiers.
Note that mixing alone is not sufficient to guarantee privacy, the data itself can still be
used to identify a participant. For this, there has been a lot of research in data obfuscation
which provides some level of anonymity (k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and others) which
should be used in addition to mix networks. Other privacy and security related requirements
are outlined by Giannetsos et al. [3], He et al. [4], and Christin et al. [5] however, these are
out of the scope of this paper. These include privacy-preserving resilient incentive mechanisms
and fairness (users should receive credits and rewards for their participation without associating
themselves with the data or the tasks they contributed), communication integrity confidentiality
and authentication (all entities should be authenticated and their communications should be
protected from any alteration and disclosure to unauthorized parties), authorization and access
control (participating users should act according to the policies specified by the sensing task),
data-centric trust (Mechanisms must be in place to assess the trustworthiness and the validity
of user submitted data), and accountability (entities should be held accountable for actions that
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could disrupt the system operation or harm users).
As we will see in section 2 the concept of mix networks is not new, however, there are no
studies that evaluate the performance of peer to peer opportunistic mixing using real world
mobility data of the participants. In this paper, our goal is not to introduce a novel data mixing
strategy but rather to focus specifically on evaluating the efficacy of mixing the data, as part of
a slicing and mixing strategy, in a fully opportunistic way with the goal of achieving a uniform
distribution of the data among all participants. We assume that participants are mobile and
generate data by using sensors or answering surveys and that they regularly cross paths with at
least one other participant in order to exchange data in a peer to peer manner. Furthermore,
we require that all participants together form a connected graph with respect to who they meet.
The mixing strategy we use is very basic so as to provide baseline results that can later be used
to evaluate more complex strategies.
In section 2 we present some related work on privacy techniques and data mixing in the
context of participatory sensing, in section 3 we describe a data mixing scheme, in section 4 we
verify the mixing scheme in a simulated environment. Finally, in section 5 we summarize the
results and provide design implications.
2 Related Work
There are several measures of anonymity for data content: k-anonymity is achieved when each
data value occurs at least k times, l-diversity is a stronger privacy indicator and ensures that
there are at least l well represented values for sensitive attributes based on entropy among
other metrics, other stronger privacy indicators commonly used is t-closeness [6][7][8]. As we
mentioned, these metrics are about the data content as a whole and are not relevant to this work
which focuses on how to ensure privacy during data reporting at the source.
If only aggregate information is needed from a set of data, privacy-preserving data aggregation
schemes have been proposed in order to safely provide aggregate information such as value
averages, minimums, and maximums about the underlying data using homomorphic encryption
or other techniques [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. These aggregate values cannot be used by a researcher or
other entity to train machine learning models like neural networks or SVMs which most often
require the data to not be aggregated. It is advantageous to do the least amount of manipulation
on the data in order to retain as much utility as possible.
A common practice when performing studies is to use pseudonyms for the participants while
keeping the data at its pure form. However it has been shown overwhelmingly that this does
not necessarily guarantee the privacy of the participants [14, 15, 16]. Other approaches use mix
networks or mix zones to reassign pseudonyms to the participants or to mix data. These methods
have been shown to be an effective way to protect the participant’s identity by decoupling the
data from the user who collected it [17, 18, 19]. Mix networks are well studied and quite robust
at what they are designed to do, which is to shuffle the batches of data (i.e. permuting the
order of the batches with respect to the pseudonyms). The limitation of this approach is that
the participants who generate the data often have to trust the mix network and additionally,
for many mix network designs, individual data entries remain in the original batch so that
when the identity of the participant is discovered for one piece of data from a batch then the
rest of the batch can be assumed to belong to that same participant. Mix zones are fixed in
space and require that participants enter these zones to satisfy certain privacy aspects like k-
anonymity by guaranteeing that the data is mixed among k participants making them unsuitable
for opportunistic settings.
A novel approach to data privacy is slicing and mixing. First developed for wireless sen-
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sor networks, it partitions the data horizontally and then mixes it before aggregating values
(SMART) [20]. It was adapted for privacy in data publishing for human-generated data by par-
titioning the data both vertically and horizontally where in the former, care is taken to group
highly correlated attributes together. Then these slices are permuted in order to break the link-
ing between different columns [21]. Many works have extended slicing to be used in participatory
sensing scenarios for privacy-preserving data aggregation[9] but only a few have looked into how
the mixing might perform in real world environment with real people (ex. Qiu et al. [22] use taxi
traces to simulate participants) and none to our knowledge do an analysis of the effectiveness
of mixing when it comes to opportunistic peer to peer (P2P) mixing scenarios. Christin et al.
[23, 24] also used P2P techniques to obfuscate location information however, their evaluation
does not generalize to other types of data.
3 Privacy-conscious Data Shuffling
From here on we will refer to the participants (users in Figure 1) who are generating the data as
sensor nodes or just nodes. Our simple opportunistic shuffling scheme consists of the following
steps: Once a node i meets another node j, they randomly select some of their data in order to
swap it with each other. The nodes follow their regular mobility patterns and are exchanging
data with each other when they come into direct communication range of each other until certain
stopping criteria relating to the state of the shuffle are met. As we mentioned earlier, we require
that the nodes form a connected graph so that the entirety of the data can be uniformly shuffled.
If there are any disconnected subsets of nodes the data will have no way to be communicated
between those subsets, only within them.
3.1 Data exchange
When two nodes come within communication range of each other, each node randomly selects
half of the data they have in their possession, M , to exchange with the other. This value can be
adjusted individually on each node to adjust their data exposure and either reduce or increase
the potential amount of personal data that they might share at each transaction. The specifics
of this adjustment are not explored in this paper and we keep the amount of data that each node
exchanges at M2 as it is optimal for reaching a uniform distribution of data in the least number of
shuffles. This fact can be easily verified by looking at the number of ways there are to choose k
data from M given by the binomial coefficient which can be calculated using the equation below:(
k
M
)
= M !
k! (M − k)! (1)
Each shuffle becomes more random as the binomial coefficient increases in value. If we set k to
be some fraction x ∈ [0, 1] of the total data M , k = xM , then we can find that the value of x
which maximizes the result in the equation above is 12 .
3.2 Stopping criteria
There are two different stopping criteria that can be used to signify that the data has been
sufficiently shuffled (uniformly distributed) and that it is safe to send it to the data collector.
The first one is based on each nodes perception of how well the data is mixed. Each node
can keep track of the data that they come into contact with and measure the probability that
they encounter some specific piece of data. Since the data may be encrypted, the nodes must
keep track of the encrypted data or a shorter hashed version of the encrypted data which can
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come paired up with the encrypted data. Once the probability is close to being uniform across
all data, then they can stop the shuffling process since this indicates a near uniform mix. This
might work well when there are not many nodes, but as the number of nodes increases, the time
it takes to verify the uniformity of the mix also increases.
The second set of stopping criteria is based on the properties of the graph like closeness
centrality. If, in addition to data, the nodes exchanged information about their graph connections
(nodes that they have previously encountered) or there is prior knowledge about the graph, then
they can estimate the number of exchanges that they need to perform before the data is near
uniformly mixed.
Closeness centrality to estimate stopping criteria. Closeness centrality is a measure of
the degree to which an individual node is near all other nodes in the network. In order for each
node to calculate its closeness centrality it needs to know its distance to all other nodes. This is
trivial when there is global knowledge about the graph, however, it may not always be the case,
especially when there is no trusted party to provide this information. When there is no prior
graph knowledge, each node i needs to communicate its personal adjacency matrix Ai in addition
to the data at each exchange. Ai should initially indicate which nodes are directly connected
(one hop) along with the edge weight as it is calculated by the node (in this case, edge weight is
equivalent to the number of times that the node has encountered each of its one hop neighbors).
Then the node can update Ai by combining all the personal adjacency matrices it has acquired
(Aj , Ak, etc.) from other nodes. To update Ai when the node receives another node’s personal
adjacency matrix Aj we perform the following operation:
Algorithm 1: Procedure to combine Ai with Aj
Data: Ai, Aj
Result: updated Ai
1 if Aik,l = ∅ and Ajk,l 6= ∅ then
2 Aik,l ← Ajk,l
3 end
4 if Aik,l 6= ∅ and Ajk,l 6= ∅ then
5 Aik,l ← min
(
Aik,l, A
j
k,l
)
6 end
Finally, performing a shortest path algorithm such as the Floyd-Warshall or Dijkstra algo-
rithm can reduce the redundancies and update the paths in Ai. The process is illustrated in
figure 2
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Figure 2: On the left, two personal adjacency matrices. On the right, the combined outcome
where overlapping weights are assigned the minimum of the two values. Grey values indicate
values calculated by the shortest path algorithm that have not been directly measured otherwise.
The closeness centrality can then be calculated for each node and by each node using the
information in their respective adjacency matrix.
The stopping criteria for the number of exchanges necessary to sufficiently mix the data can
then be estimated from the adjacency matrix and closeness centrality information using empirical
data which we will show in section 4.
It is important to note that if the graph of the nodes is known to everyone, encrypting the
communication channel becomes even more vital for the protection of the security and privacy
of nodes against malicious nodes.
4 Experiment and Results
4.1 Experimental setup
To verify our data mixing scheme, we perform simulations using artificial parameters as well
as simulations using real mobility data from the MDC dataset. The data mixing occurs in
shuffling rounds that consist of either a group of markov chain state transitions (representing
data exchanges) based on the transition matrix or a full day (24 hours) of proximity events in
the real mobility data simulations.
At each time t, a node i will exchange data with a node j either with a probability based on
the Ai,j element of the transition matrix A for the artificial parameter simulations or based on
the proximity of the two nodes in the real mobility data simulations. At each shuffle we take
note of what data each node has.
In order to get representative probability distributions of the data, we run 30000 trials of the
simulation with each of the parameter sets (a parameter set consists of the following: the number
of nodes, data size per node, and the transition matrix or proximity events). This number was
selected because it gives us a confidence level of 99% based on the equation n ≥ log(a)log(1−p) to
calculate the number of trials necessary given the probability of the occurrence of an event p and
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the confidence level 1 − a that we require. In our case we seek to be confident of events that
occur with a probability of at least p = 0.00015, that is to say that our probability distributions
in our results will have a granularity of 0.00015. We choose 1− a = 0.99 which is equivalent to
being 99% confident in our results.
For our experiments, the total number of nodes, N , and the amount of data items, M , that
they start with is selected as described in section 4.1.3. To keep track on how the data flows
throughout the network we make sure that each node’s initial data is uniquely identifiable by
labeling them with integers. For example, if we set the number of data to 6, then node 1’s data
will consist of the numbers from 1 to 6, node 2’s data will consist of the numbers from 7 to 12,
etc.. In this way we can easily check how uniformly the data has been distributed by evaluating
the probability distribution of each number being in any specific node at the end of the shuffle.
4.1.1 Artificial Parameter Simulations Setup
Initially, we performed simulated experiments with artificial parameters to illustrate and validate
the data shuffling procedure. Node mobility is artificially simulated by using three different
Markov models where each one is defined by a transition matrix A. The three models consist of
a best case scenario transition matrix (equivalent to a group of co-workers or students enrolled
in the same course), an intermediate case scenario (equivalent to shift-based co-workers), and
a worst case scenario transition matrix (equivalent to otherwise unrelated commuters crossing
paths on their way to their individual workplaces). The specifics of the transition matrices are
described in section 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Real Mobility Data (MDC) Simulations Setup
We use real user mobility traces from the data of the Mobile Data Challenge (MDC) which
include GPS traces of real mobile users [25, 26]. The data we used included 191 users and
spanned over a year of data for some of the users. To normalize and be able to compare with the
artificial cases, we define one shuffling round as a single day and we analyze up to 100 contiguous
days (i.e. 100 shuffling rounds) of GPS traces for each trial.
For some users, we might have less than 100 days of data, when we reach the end of the data
without having completed the 100 shuffling rounds we cycle from the beginning until we reach
the desired number. For example, if a user set only has 50 days worth of data, we will go though
his GPS data twice to complete the 100 day trial.
In most cases we have more than 100 days of data for each user set. In this case, since we
limit our simulations to 100 shuffling rounds consisting of 100 contiguous days, we make sure
that we select 100 contiguous days when the user set is sufficiently active based on two criteria
in order of priority: the median of the number of proximity events between all pairs in the user
set, and the total number of proximity events.
We assume an exchange of data between two users can be performed under the following
conditions:
• They are within 50 meters or less of each other. We call this a proximity event since they
are within direct communication range of each other.
• They have not exchanged data between each other in the past 30 minutes.
In these experiments we do not consider the bandwidth or throughput of the data transmission
and assume that it can be instantaneously exchanged when two users are within communication
range.
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For each of the 30000 trials for the MDC data simulations, a random subset of N users was
selected from the 191 in such a way that they formed a connected graph with a minimum edge
weight of 10 (in this case, edge weight indicates the number of exchanges between two users
during the entire duration of the study). With this random selection, when we use N = 10 the
average number of hops between the two most remote users was 9 and the median number of
hops between any two users was 3 (which resembles a line topology). The user set was unique
in each trial of our simulations, i.e. no two trials had the same set of 10 random users.
We ran an additional simulation with the MDC dataset in which instead of selecting N
random users, we selected N users that formed a clique (i.e. a fully connected topology with
maximum distance of one hop between any two users). Again, we limited the edge weight to be
equal to or above 10. During our experiments we discovered that there were not enough cliques
of size ≥ N in the dataset to justify doing 30000 trials. The total number of maximal cliques
(cliques that are not subsets of larger cliques) in the dataset is 890 and the number of cliques
with size of at least N is often much smaller than that. It is redundant to perform more trials
than there are number of cases because this means that the same case will need to be repeated
several times to reach the desired amount of trials. However, to get meaningful statistics it was
necessary to do a much larger number of trials than there were number of cliques. To remedy
this, we relaxed the requirement for the cliques and allowed ourselves to combine cliques to form a
set of N users. The exact procedure by which we combined the cliques is described in Algorithm
2. The if statement on lines 4-6 is optional and serves to limit the minimum size of the cliques
that form the user set thus ensuring a better connected user set. This algorithm allowed us to
Algorithm 2: Procedure to combine cliques
Data: The user cliques
Result: A well connected user set
1 userSet← ∅
2 while size(userSet) < N do
3 cliq ← randomclique
4 if size(cliq) < 0.5 (N − size (userSet)) then
5 go to line 3
6 end
7 userSet← userSet ∪ cliq
8 if size(userSet) > N then
9 userSet← select N users ∈ userSet
10 end
11 end
12 if userSet not connected then
13 go to line 1
14 end
generate much more than 30000 different user sets as evidenced by the results in our simulations
where for N = 10 there were no two trials with the same user set in all of the 30000 trials.
Furthermore, N = 10 resulted in user sets with the average number of hops between the two
most remote users at 4 and a median number of hops between any two users of 1.
4.1.3 Parameter Sets
The number of nodes and number of data items for the MDC data simulations was selected
after the artificially simulated cases where we verified that the number of data items did not
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Sim. type Transition Matrix {# of Nodes, # of Data}
best case fully connected topology w/ prob of no
transaction 0 and prob of transation
with each of the other nodes 1N−1
{10,6} {30,6} {10,20}
intermediate case line topology w/ prob of no transaction
0.5 for edge nodes and 0 for all other
nodes
{10,6} {30,6} {10,20}
worst case line topology w/ prob of no transaction
0.8 for edge nodes and 0.6 for all other
nodes
{10,6} {30,6} {10,20}
MDC data random GPS traces of a random selection of
users
{10,6}
MDC data cliques GPS traces of cliques of users {10,6}
Table 1: Simulations performed showing total nodes and total amount of data per node for each
simulation. There are 11 simulations in total.
significantly affect the number of shuffles needed since we always exchange half of a node’s total
data (as per the protocol discussed in section 3.1). We chose to simulate only 2 representative
cases with the MDC dataset: choosing a connected set of random users, or choosing users that
form cliques in the adjacency matrix. Other cases would be redundant since we already show the
effects of changing the number of nodes and data items with the artificial parameter simulations.
All simulations are summarized in Table 1.
4.2 Performance Criteria
The performance criteria that we mainly use is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a uniform
distribution of 1N as the reference distribution. With this test, we measure the absolute error
between the distribution of the data in our experiment and the ideal uniform distribution. As a
result of our experimental setup we are able to perform this test after every shuffling round in
our experiment allowing us to see the exact number of shuffles needed to achieve a near uniform
mix.
For illustrative purposes we first take a look at the probability of holding a specific data item
for each node at each shuffling round.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Results Using Artificial Parameters
Intuitively, the more shuffles we do then the more uniform the distribution of the data should be.
This intuition is verified in figure 3a where we clearly see that the probability of holding a specific
data item (as an example we use the data item with number 3) approaches an ideal probability
with amplitude 1N as the number of shuffles increases, where N is the number of nodes. Since
node 1 is the initial holder of the data item with number 3, it starts with the highest probability
in the initial stages and as it shares data with all the other nodes the probability evens out.
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Figure 3: Results for the best case scenario for N = 10 and M = 6
The same is true for the intermediate and worst case of the line topology as we can see in
figures 4a and 5a, although, in this case it takes more than 40 shuffling rounds to reach the same
ideal probability for each of the cases. Similarly to the best case, we notice that node 1 starts out
with higher probability of holding the data with number 3, and then we notice a sharp increase
on the probability of node 2 holding it since it is the only node that is connected to node 1 (recall
that intermediate and worst case scenarios have the line topology of nodes).
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Figure 4: Results for the intermediate case scenario for N = 10 and M = 6
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Figure 5: Results for the worst case scenario for N = 10 and M = 6
4.3.2 Results using MDC Dataset
In figures 6a and 7a we see the results of the MDC dataset simulations. For the MDC simulation
with the random selection of users, although the connectivity resembles that of line topology, we
cannot see it in figure 6a (like in figures 4a and 5a) because the users are not ideally ordered
at each trial to reveal the same pattern as the artificial parameter simulation with line topology
(recall that they were randomly selected).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
shuffle #
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Probability of a node holding the number 3 - MDC, N=10, M=6
Node 1
Node 2
Node 3
Node 4
Node 5
75 80 85 90 95 100
0.09
0.1
0.11
0.12
(a) The probability distribution of the number 3
being at different nodes at different number of
shuffles (subplot is of a magnified region)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
shuffle #
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
D
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic D - MDC, N=10, M=6
Centralized shuffle
Multi-Party shuffle
D=0.035
75 80 85 90
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
(b) The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at
different number of shuffles(subplot is of a magni-
fied region)
Figure 6: Results for the MDC data with random user selection for N = 10 and M = 6
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Simulation type # of shuffles for D < 0.035
Best case 4
Intermediate case 46
Worst case 100
MDC data random 85
MDC data cliques 40
Table 2: Summary of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results for N = 10 M = 6.
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Figure 7: Results for the MDC data with clique user selection for N = 10 and M = 6
4.3.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the experiment
As we can see in figures 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, and 7b, the error decreases as the number of shuffles
increases. For our experimental setup, 4 shuffles is sufficient to adequately shuffle the data in
the best case scenario while more than 60 shuffling rounds are needed in order to reach a similar
distribution of the data for the worst case scenario. The MDC dataset simulation with random
user selection is comparable to the worst case scenario while with clique based user selection it
is better than the intermediate case but worse than the best case scenario.
4.3.4 Effects of varying number of nodes and number of data items
For the fully connected topology (best case), varying the number of nodes or number of data
items does not seem to have an effect on performance. For the line topology (intermediate
and worst case), increasing the number of nodes also increases the number of shuffles necessary.
However increasing the number of data items does not have a noticeable effect for those cases.
These conclusions can be verified in the figures 8,9, and 10 which show the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic as function of the shuffles for different selection of total nodes N and total data items
M .
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Figure 8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for different selection of N and M of the best case scenario
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Figure 9: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for different selection of N and M of the intermediate case
scenario
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Figure 10: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for different selection of N and M of the worst case scenario
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we evaluated a basic peer to peer opportunistic mixing strategy in order to gener-
ate a baseline of results which can later be used to compare different strategies. We did this by
opportunistically shuffling the data among the participants and showed that the number of shuf-
fles is dependent on the properties of the graph that represents the participant interconnections.
A fully connected topology requires only 4 shuffling rounds. On the other hand, a line topology
required significantly more shuffling rounds; 46 rounds for the intermediate case and 100 shuffling
rounds for the worst case. Using real user GPS traces from the MDC dataset we saw that the
number of shuffling rounds did not exceed the worst case when selecting random nodes from the
population but at 85 rounds it was significantly higher than the intermediate case. Carefully
selecting nodes from the population in the MDC dataset to form a more connected topology
made a significant difference in the efficiency of the shuffling (only 40 shuffling rounds) and was
significantly better than the intermediate case.
These results can be used to define the stopping criteria for a near uniform shuffle based on
the topology of the nodes. A set of 10 nodes in a fully connected topology (having an average
closeness centrality of 1) would require at least 4 shuffles. Whereas a set of 10 nodes in a line
topology (having an average closeness centrality of 0.3430), would require 100 shuffles. For the
MDC dataset the closeness centrality ranged from 0.3430 to 1 and from 0.6 to 1 for the random
user selection and the clique-based user selection respectively.
Opportunistic peer to peer mixing, as part of a slicing and mixing strategy, can therefore
reasonably mix the data so as to protect the identity of the source in the context of the data
routing. However, the data content itself should be further obfuscated in order to protect the
identity of the source which might be revealed from analyzing the data content. Such techniques
require the manipulation of data entries and can reduce the quality of the data but it is often
necessary to do so for the protection of the participants.
Based on the positive results of these simulations, we plan to implement this in a real study
to verify the results with mobility data that is collected in a different city.
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